The research question addressed by this paper is a simple one: are European consumers happy with the price they pay for electricity supply services after two decades of reforms? We focus on self-assessed consumers' satisfaction as reported in three waves of Eurobarometer survey, 2000-2002-2004, conditioning on a set of indicators of public ownership, vertical integration and entry regulation across the EU-15. Our results do not support a systematic association between consumers' satisfaction and the reform package. These results, which have been extensively tested for robustness, raise various concerns about the way the reform processes have been undertaken and provides some warnings about possible effects on public support for utility reforms.
Introduction
Privatisation, vertical disintegration and liberalisation have extensively reshaped the structure of network industries (Newbery 2000; Pollitt, 2007) in the European Union (EU) over two decades (see e.g. Martin, Roma and Vansteenkiste, 2005 , for a survey). While empirical literature has usually focussed on changes in efficiency of the utilities, rather surprisingly the research on the impact of reforms on consumers is less developed (with some notable exceptions, such as the research by Catherine Waddams and her co-authors, see e.g. Brazier et al 2006, Giulietti et al. 2005) . Moreover, most of the empirical literature on this subject deals with individual countries, because of the lack of comparable cross-country evidence.
In this paper we explore perceptions by European consumers, i.e. subjective data on happiness with the price of electricity across the EU-15. In related papers we also extend the analysis to other network industries (telephone services and gas supply) and to other issues (accessibility, quality).
There are two reasons to consider data on social attitudes in the context of utility reform. First, because attitudes are important per se. Policy-makers and regulators are well aware that utility reforms are in the forefront of public debate in the EU, and may raise vocal opposition or support. Second, subjective data can be a complement to objective evidence in order to evaluate the welfare impact of reforms.
In this paper we use self-declared individual attitudes to answer a simple research question: Are consumers happier in countries where the electricity industry has been privatized, unbundled and opened to market? We use three waves of Eurobarometer Surveys, 2000 -2002 , for the EU-15 countries, and Regref (Regulatory Reform) data provided by the OECD to describe the extent of reform by country and by year. We then test the association of privatisation and regulatory reforms on attitudes of users of electricity. Our approach, while based on easily accessible databases and standard econometric methods, is novel in the regulatory economics literature. It addresses an important policy reform issue in the EU and of some relevance for other regions (e.g the US and Latin America) where some have advocated electricity reforms building on the liberalisation experience in Europe, and notably in the UK.
Our empirical findings suggest that first, individual consumers attitudes on electricity prices are strongly correlated with average prices in each country; second, that the implementation of the reform package (privatisation, vertical disintegration and free access to the market) does not increase the probability to be satisfied in the EU after having controlled for individual and country specific factors. In fact, privatisation is correlated with the probability to be dissatisfied with prices. We offer our interpretation of these rather counter-intuitive results by a simple micro-economics and political economy argument, and discuss possible policy implications.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: after a discussion of our research motivation (Section 2), a presentation of Eurobarometer and Regref data (Section 3), and a descriptive statistics (Section 4), we estimate a set of conditional models of consumer satisfaction (Section 5). In the concluding section we discuss our findings and their policy implications.
Research motivation
The electricity industry includes four different activities: generation, transmission (the high voltage network), distribution (the middle and low voltage network), retail (supply to final consumers). These four activities or industry segments have different technological and economic features, and show some variability across countries. Generation is often considered as potentially competitive, because economies of scale in most types of production processes are said to be not large. Transmission and distribution are natural monopolies, at the national and regional level, because of the high network fixed sunk costs. Eventually, retail supply is often seen as potentially competitive, because trading and marketing activities do not imply high fixed costs.
In the 1980s all or some of these activities were vertically integrated in many European countries. National or municipally owned enterprises were often (but not everywhere) the key players. The market was highly regulated, with very limited opportunities for users to switch to alternative suppliers. There was no third party access to the transmission grid. This integrated pattern was the deliberate result of policy reforms that consolidated the mostly private and fragmented European electricity industry in its earlier stages, under the governments' view that the previous pattern, mainly based on regional private monopolies or collusive oligopoly, was either inefficient or undesirable (see Millward, 2006 , for a detailed history of nationalisation and consolidation in Europe). Despite some policy convergence in the interwar years, and further reforms in the 1950s, in the following half century there were persistent and significant variations in industry organisation across countries in Europe, in terms of technologies, ownership, governance, per capita-consumption, spatial and vertical integration, market structure, and prices.
Following privatisation and liberalisation in the UK in the 1990s, and the EU directives in the last ten years, a new paradigm has emerged, or 'a measure of consensus over some generic measures for achieving a well functioning market-oriented industry' (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007, p. 2) . For the first time in the history of the electricity industry in Europe a unique cross-country policy reform pattern has been advocated and is being applied. Similar reforms have been implemented in some developing countries, closely monitored by the international institutions such as the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (e.g. for a discussion of the current situation of the South East Europe electricity market, see Pollit, 2007) .
The new paradigm is usually simplified as suggesting three parallel reforms: privatisation (sale of existing publicly owned firms and licensing of private entrants), unbundling (associated with incentive regulation of the networks, third-party-access, establishing and independent regulator), and liberalisation (i.e. allowing entry and competition in generation and retail).
In a World Bank publication (Lampietti et al., 2007) a quite longer list of reform items is suggested:
a) De-monopolisation and regulation: unbundling vertically integrated monopolies to foster competition in generation and supply; privatize and shifting the role of the state from owner to regulator; promoting entry by foreign investors; establishing transparent energy markets; building regulatory capacity b) Prices and fiscal policy: promote fully cost-reflective prices; elimination of production subsidies; taxation based on externality correction; enforce metering and collection of bills; closing uneconomic plants c) Foreign trade: opening markets to imports; eliminating taxes on fuels and electricity; strengthening regional trading arrangements; expanding trans-boundary energy connections d) Investment policy: rely on energy companies to sustain investment, not on the public sector budget; support energy efficiency ; increase flows of foreign capital with appropriate measures e) Social protection: safety nets for the redundant staff; social service functions to be transferred to local governments, not to companies; support to the poor through lifeline tariffs or means-tested subsidies (abolish cross-subsidies) f) Environmental protection: supporting environmental assessment; introducing emission norms; mainstreaming new environmentally friendly technologies.
In fact, many items in the reform package, while per se more ore less defensible, are not strongly connected. The degrees of freedom in the reform design are higher than sometimes is suggested. For example, opening market to imports may be consistent with different ownership regimes. In principle, there is nothing that prevents the import of electricity from abroad when the generation or the transmission network is publicly owned, as in Italy, a strong net importer from France and Switzerland. Vested interests against international trade can be strong either under public or private ownership if there is collusion of national competitors. Unbundling, in turn, can be legal, accounting, or ownership separation, with quite different implications. Vertical integration can be combined with liberalisation under effectively regulated third party access (in the UK the telecoms regulator decided for functional separation of the BT network and against more radical solutions). Liberalisation of generation can be combined with constraints to retail competition (as it happened in many countries before a EU directive). The case for implementing the comprehensive reform paradigm rests on limited cross-country empirical research based on standard econometric approaches.
Some of the tenets of the paradigm depend upon a large number of pre-conditions. For example, while sometimes the new paradigm has been justified by dramatic technological changes that were assumed to reshape the industry, e.g. new generation process using gas as fuel and the loss of economies of scale, the mix of energy sources in Europe, from nuclear to hydro, is too diverse to support a technology-based explanation of the policy reversal from nationalisation and vertical integration toward the opposite trend.
It seems more reasonable to look at the new paradigm as a set of policy reforms based on increased confidence in market forces and private ownership, against the decline in confidence in planning and public ownership, for a number of reasons that we do not discuss in this paper. Moreover, the ambition by the European Commission (EC) to create an 'internal' (in fact a trans-boundary) market for services of general interest, may contribute to the explanation to the policy reversal, probably more than any compelling technological shift.
As for any public policy, the evaluation of welfare changes is the cornerstone of predicting long term success. In developed economies, where issues of access and quality of the services are a relatively minor concern, the key signal that influences the consumers' evaluation of public utilities reforms is consumers' price, the main focus of our research.
A simple mental experiment clarifies why prices, quantities and consumer surplus can change after reform. Suppose there is a vertically integrated, government-owned monopoly that provides electricity, under constant returns. The pricing rule is to equal a uniform national price to long run marginal cost. This arrangement allows, however, for some X-inefficiency, perhaps because of low incentives for the managers to minimise costs or overinvestment.
A first reform would be to privatise without any (binding) price regulation, shifting the monopoly from public to private ownership. Costs will decrease but there will be allocative inefficiency. If the latter effect is greater than the former, prices may increase even if costs decrease. The consumer does not get a dividend from the reform and maybe incurring into a loss. Second, a regulatory body is introduced. It caps the price, probably not so low as to entirely squeeze the monopoly rents, or the incentive case for private ownership would disappear. The price here decreases by assumption, while costs are again minimised. Third, the regulator understands that there is still scope to correct the remaining allocative inefficiency by market entry. The incumbent is then forced to divest the network and open it to licensed competitors. Vertical disintegration per se, i.e. without actual entry, might however increase marginal costs, hence prices. With third party access, and no price collusion, the entrant has an incentive to offer at a lower price and to give up rents to capture a market share, and the incumbent needs to follow.
When you consider the ups and down of relative prices in the mental experiment, at the beginning you trade off productive inefficiency against allocative inefficiency (privatisation). The outcome of the second step (price regulation) depends upon information and objectives of the regulatory body. The third reform step seeks allocative efficiency (competition) at the cost of some productive inefficiency (unbundling), the reverse of the initial trade-off.
The benefits and costs of the reform to the consumer, for a given market demand, apparently depend on: a) the extent of inefficiency under public ownership relative to a benchmark; b) the outcome of price regulation; c) the cost of vertical disintegration (coordination, transaction costs); d) the benefits of market entry in terms of decreasing price and increasing quantity.
It is not self-evident that in any country and in any industry one specific organisation welfare dominates another one, because technology, demand elasticity, quality of institutions, and the costs of reform may widely differ. What is perhaps good for one country is not necessarily the best recipe for another one. This may question the concept of a standardised approach.
After more than ten years of experience with the implementation of the electricity reform paradigm in Europe, it seems appropriate to move from speculation on its merits to testing its impact on empirical grounds. While there is some evidence of successful reform at the country level within the EU, e.g. for the UK (Newbery and Pollit, 1997, and Domah and Pollit, 2001 ) and for the Scandinavian countries (von der Fehr and Bergman, 2005) , other authors, using cross country data, are unable to find clear econometric evidence of the positive effects of reforms (e.g. Steiner, 2001 and Hattori and Tsutsui, 2004 for the early phases of the reform process.
Particularly, it would be interesting to check the differential impact of privatisation against other reforms, because admittedly their association is far from granted (see Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005) . While the EU directives are mute on this point, OECD and World Bank economists tend to link together ownership and market reforms (see Conway and Nicoletti, 2006, or Lampietti et al., 2007) .
Because, however, the jury on the optimal combination of reforms is still out, the last word on their outcome rests ultimately on empirical analysis. It is apparent that, while there is a common direction of reform, substantial variations exist over time and across states. Our empirical analysis exploits this variability.
Ideally one would like to consider micro-evidence of welfare changes. The informative burden to look into individual agents would be considerable, because one would need to know preferences about different uses, price structures for type of users, and their income. This information at the EU level is not available in comparable form across Member States. For example, we have comparable national data on the price per kWh by domestic users of electricity broken down by ranges of yearly consumption, but we do not have matching data on the income of those users, or even the number of individuals by each household.
One strategy to discover some individual-level information is to adopt a different empirical shortcut: instead of (or as a complement to) relying on revealed preference through the estimation of individual compensated demand functions (or their proxies) we can turn to stated preferences, i.e. subjective well-being measures. In other words, we analyse consumers' answers to direct questions about their own satisfaction about price paid of electricity supply.
While this may look as a dramatic change of perspective in economic welfare analysis, it is in fact much less strong that it may appear when compared with actual practice of cost-benefit testing in project or policy evaluation. In fact, applied CBA, usually regarded as objective welfare evaluation and often officially endorsed by government agencies, routinely uses contingent evaluation methods e.g. in regulatory impact analysis (see Boardman at al, 2005 for a survey of applied literature). Such methods revolve around eliciting, through surveys on users, direct information on willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept policy changes.
To an applied welfare economist, using revealed or stated preferences is a matter of convenience and of data availability more than a fundamental methodological divide.
This discussion of empirical approaches to the evaluation of the welfare impact of policy reforms has a close resemblance with the wider debate on the merits of the 'economics of happiness' (Graham, 2006 , Layard, 2005 . The typical focus of this recent research avenue is the study of the relationship between subjective well being as self assessed by individuals, and objective macroeconomic welfare indicators, such as national income, inflation or unemployment (Frey and Stutzer, 2002) . We propose to use a similar approach in a microeconomic context. Services of general interest are sufficiently important to influence perceptions of well being. While such perceptions can be wrong, they are of course based on the information set available to the respondent, plus an idiosyncratic bias. Thus, when a respondent says, in one country and in one year, that he evaluates the price of electricity as 'fair', we can assume that he is telling us something about his subjective well being. It seems reasonable to assume that if an individual is happy with the price he pays, then he is in a better (perceived) welfare position than somebody who feels to be compelled to pay too much for what he gets. Moreover, we can test this, using average national prices as a control variable. The parallelism with happiness economics is here that while the latter research typically relates overall subjective well being to macroeconomic issues, here we focus on satisfaction on specific, albeit important consumption items. If there are variations across time and across countries in the frequency of those who assess the price of services as fair, we can exploit this variability to indirectly test the consensus around the reform.
The data
Eurobarometer public opinion surveys (henceforth, EB) have been conducted on behalf of the Directorate-General for Education and Culture of the European Commission each spring and autumn since autumn 1973. An identical set of questions is asked to representative samples of the population aged fifteen years or over in each Member State. In each household, the respondent is drawn at random. Questions are asked during a face-to-face interview at respondent's home and in the appropriate national language. The regular sample in standard Eurobarometer surveys is 1000 people per country except Luxembourg (600), the United Kingdom (1000 in Great Britain and 300 in Northern Ireland) and Germany (since EB 34, 1000 in East Germany and 1000 in West Germany). Each survey comes with a set of weights obtained, using marginal and intercellular weighting, carried out on the basis of the population description provided by Eurostat in the Regional Statistics Yearbooks. We use these weights throughout the whole analysis to follow. , including telephone, electricity supply, gas supply, water supply, postal, transport and rail services. In this paper we focus on consumers' satisfaction with electricity prices for two main reasons. First, electricity is an important sector which, in recent years and with variability across the EU-15, has undergone a large number of extensive reforms mostly aimed at reducing the public sector share in the industry, and increasing liberalisation and vertical disintegration of the industry. Second, by looking at prices rather than quality or accessibility, for instance, we concentrate on a clearly identifiable economic variable, which is easily understood by customers thus presumably reducing measurement error, and a variable that is supposed to be mostly affected by recent reforms.
Respondents are asked to state whether they find that the price paid for electricity services is excessive, unfair or fair. However, as the difference between excessive and unfair may not be very clear-cut, we classified respondents into "satisfied" and "not satisfied". In particular, the dichotomous (0/1) consumer price satisfaction variable is recorded equal to 1 if the respondent states that the price he pays for electricity services is fair, and is recorded equal to 0 otherwise.
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As shown in Table 1 , which reports the unconditional mean of the dichotomous satisfaction variable and its standard error in each country and in the whole EU-15, it is possible to spot groups of countries where satisfaction is relatively high with respect to others. Some Southern European countries, namely Italy, Greece and Portugal tend to score the worst for electricity price satisfaction, others, such as the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark score the best. There is also some trend of an increasing satisfaction along the six-year period considered. The trend is clearly positive for countries such as Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Austria, while in Greece, Finland and Sweden is negative, and across the whole EU-15 there are signs that the average satisfaction with consumers price is improving.
There are a set of possible reasons why satisfaction is so different across EU-15 member countries. It might be that some countries show a lower level of satisfaction than others because people tend to complain more than in others, or because some groups of the population (e.g. unemployed) are sampled more often than others, or it might be that some country-specific characteristics affect average national satisfaction. For instance, it might be that satisfaction with SGI price and quality is correlated with general economic conditions of the countries, so that if workers have trouble finding jobs and income growth is sluggish, they might also rate a lower satisfaction with SGI services than in a period of economic expansion. Or it might be that electricity market conditions matter and as across the EU liberalisation, privatisation and vertical disintegration of the electricity industry differ, this might be reflected in the average level of consumers' satisfaction. Advocates of this latter view, often look at rankings of liberalised, privatised, disintegrated industries.
One of these rankings can be constructed using Regref, an increasingly popular regulatory database produced at the OECD (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006; Alesina et at. 2005) . This database records a set of variables including "public ownership" (PO), which measures the public ownership in the electricity sector and is coded from 0 (private ownership) to 6 (public ownership), "vertical integration" (VI), which is an indicator of vertical separation and is coded from 0 (ownership separation) to 6 (integration), and "entry regulation" (ER), which measures legal conditions of entry in a market and is coded from 0 (free entry) to 6 (franchised to one firm). The sector indicator (SEC) comes as a simple average of PO, VI and ER indices. These four variables are presented as continuous variables in the [0,6] range, however they come from the aggregation of ordinal variables whose cardinalisation might be controversial. 4 For instance, while there is a clear ordering between private, mostly private, mixed, mostly public and public ownership, one may want to check whether coding these different options using equally spaced numbers between a minimum of zero and a maximum of six would alter results significantly.
Although Regref provides a long yearly time series starting in 1975, we only consider years after 1998 as the EB data are available starts in 2000 Table 2 shows the data. Table A2 in the appendix shows the values taken of the SEC, PO, ER and VI for all the EU-15 countries considered. They provide evidence of the fact that the trend has been clearly downward but also that there exists a considerable heterogeneity across countries and across time. For instance, countries such as France or Ireland have not reduced the public ownership in the largest producing firm, while the Netherlands have transformed it from public to private within a couple of years. Table A2 shows that also prices present some variability, being the highest in Portugal and in Denmark, where there is mixed public/private ownership in the electricity industry, and lowest in Finland, where mixed ownership goes along with maximum freedom of entry in the market. Also prices in PPP present some variability with lowest ones been in Finland, the UK, Luxembourg and the highest in Denmark, Italy, Portugal. Table 2 is a kind of stem-and-leaf plot, where the roots is the PO indicator, the following branches are VI and ER indicators and leaves present a clear trend towards a more private, more disintegrated and more liberalised market. A glimpse to this table points out that the United Kingdom is always at the bottom, while some of the less satisfied countries (for instance, Greece) are on the upper part of the table even in 2003. Shall we than conclude that more liberalisation make consumers happier? In the following section we try to answer this question verifying. 
The empirical model
Although informative, the results presented in the previous section are unconditional to other individual and country-specific characteristics and do not allow one to see whether there is any pattern in satisfaction across groups of consumers and across countries. In this section we try to shed some light on this issue, by analysing consumers' satisfaction, controlling for a set of information about each respondent and the country he lives in.
As we do not know the exact level of individual satisfaction, * i S , for each service, we assume that satisfaction is generated by a latent variable model: includes individual characteristics (i.e. sex, occupation) accounting for individual observed heterogeneity, timevarying country macroeconomic variables (i.e. GDP level and Gini inequality index) accounting for time-varying heterogeneity, a time fixed-effects to capture any time trend and some time-invariant country-fixed effects to capture any country-specific effects. Finally, i e accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, is a continuously distributed variable independent of cluster is the country. This approach is taken as the number of clusters is small (15) relative to the total sample size (over 30,000). 
and the coefficient [ ]
is the cohort fixed effect, assumed to be constant over time.
Working with cohort-time averages, we control for cohort fixed effects by estimating the model in deviations from the mean. As the pseudo panel analysis might be affected by a measurement error if the number of observations per cohort per time period ( ct N ) was very small, the pseudo-panel is obtained by collapsing observations by sex and type of occupations, for each year and country, with 70 ct N .
As controls, x , we used a set of individual characteristics (including sex, age, marital status, age when finished education, occupation, political views, respondent's cooperation as assessed by interviewer), 5 of country fixed-effects, year dummies, some country-level macroeconomic variables (population density, GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, employment growth rate, Gini index). All information about individual characteristics come in the Eurobarometer databases EB53 (for year 2000), EB58 (for year 2002) and EB61.2 (for year 2004), while macroeconomic variables are obtained by Eurostat or by the International Energy Agency. We also include continuous variables taken from the Regref database, namely the sector index (SEC), the public ownership (PO), vertical integration (VI) and entry regulation (ER) scores, which are obtained as weighted averages of qualitative subindicators.
Results are also checked for robustness using Regref subindicators as dummy variables, i.e. analysis whether it is the peculiar cardinalisation used in the database to drive results.
Results
In this paper we are mainly interested to assess whether privatisation, vertical disintegration and liberalisation of SGI markets have a sizeable effect on consumer satisfaction. In particular we test a particular hypothesis, that reforms moving towards more liberalisation, privatisation and regulation are positively associated with the satisfaction of consumers by exploiting the variability across time and across the EU-15 countries. Given the way the Regref indicators are defined, a negative sign on coefficients regarding one of the regulatory variables, should be interpreted as evidence that in countries with more liberalized/privatized/deregulated SGI industries, there is a higher level of satisfaction than in others. A positive sign, on the contrary, would be evidence to reject the hypothesis under test. Table 3 presents the estimation marginal effects of model (2) conditioning only on individual characteristics of the respondent on some country macroeconomic variables, besides introducing country and time dummies. It shows that females are slightly less satisfied than males, elderly people are 1% more likely to be satisfied than youngsters after controlling also for average prices. More educated people tend to be more satisfied than people who stopped studying before the age of 15, while there is no significant difference in terms of marital status, managers and students tend to be consistently more satisfied than self-employed people, with unemployed being the least satisfied. Respondents with moderate political views tend to complain less about electricity prices that people at both the extremes of the political spectrum, and controlling for respondents co-operation it emerges that less co-operative people tend to declare themselves as less satisfied with a probability between 5% and 1%.
In column (B) we controlled for some macroeconomic characteristics at the country level, 6 such as population density, Gini inequality index, per capita GDP, including also unemployment and per capita GDP growth rate and none of them seems significant, mainly due to multicorrelation problems. After dropping variables with highest variance inflating factors (namely, GDP and employment growth rate), column C shows that population density is correlated with more satisfaction, and Gini inequality index, on the contrary with less satisfaction, consistently with our a priori expectations. However, when also consumer price index and the average electricity price is included in the analysis, macroeconomic variables lose statistical significance (column D). In this latter case it emerges that satisfaction is negatively correlated with electricity consumer prices (an increase of price by ten cents would reduce the probability of satisfaction by 10%) but it is positively correlated with consumer price index (an increase of CPI by 1% would increase the probability of satisfaction by 2.7%).
Finally, Table 3 , shows that average consumer satisfaction with electricity prices is significantly larger in year 2004 compared to 2000, with probability of satisfaction across EU-15 being nearly 2% higher.
Looking a this trend one might ask whether recent policies of privatisation, market liberalisation and industry disintegration had any significant effect on consumers' satisfaction. Using the Regref indicators, we started from introducing the aggregate index for the whole sector (SEC) jointly with prices indices. In a companion paper we have showed that average PPP prices are only weakly correlated with Regref indices, reducing the risk of multicollinearity problems. Results presented in column A of Table 4 show that, probably quite surprisingly to some readers, satisfaction increases the higher is the SEC index, i.e. the farther the electricity industry sector is from full privatisation, market liberalisation and vertical disintegration. In column B the SEC index is separated in its three equally-weighting components, entry regulation (ER), vertical integration (VI) and public ownership (PO), showing that while the effect of vertical integration is not statistically different from zero, public ownership and entry regulation have a positive effect on average satisfaction. The marginal effect estimates of public ownership shows that if the PO index increased by one from its mean value, (i.e. the role of the state in the sector increased) the probability of satisfaction would increase by over 3%. In column C we tested whether results changed significantly if instead of introducing the level of Regref indices we introduced the the change on the previous year, showing the robustness of the empirical estimates of public ownership indicator on consumers' satisfaction. In columns D and E, the interaction between market liberalisation and vertical integration is introduced, as a more liberalised market often requires vertical disintegration, however it estimated effect is only to sweep out the significance of the ER effect leaving the PO marginal effect roughly unaltered.
As a further robustness check of the results, we used the subindicators of VI and ER, which are also included in the Regref data set, as continuous variable, still ranging from 0 to 6: the PO indicator remains highly significant and positive, with a marginal effect larger than 3% (column F), overall confirming the evidence that the joint policies of privatisation, vertical disintegration and liberalisation are not perceived by consumers and univocally beneficial.
Finally, considering the fact that REFREF indicators are often interpreted as continuous variable, although they are intrinsically ordinal discrete variables , we also introduced them in the analysis as dummy variables. In particular, in column G the variable PO takes value equal one if the ownership structure of the largest firm in the electricity industry is public, and zero otherwise, the variable ER1 takes value equal one if there is no third party access in the industry and zero otherwise, and the variable VI takes value equal to one if the degree of overall industry as well as its transmission and generation segments are vertically integrated and zero if they are not. Results show that, ceteris paribus, in countries where the largest firm is owned by the government, average consumers' satisfaction is roughly 12% more likely. In column H we broke down the ER index by defining the dummy ER1 which is equal one if there is no third party access (TPA) to the electricity transmission grid and zero if there is a negotiated or regulated TPA, the dummy ER2 which is equal one if there is no liberalised wholesale market for electricity and zero otherwise, and ER3 which is equal one if there is no consumer choice as for electricity supplier or the consumption threshold is larger than 250 gigawatts (which is clearly relevant threshold only for industrial consumption) and equal zero otherwise. Estimates in column H are similar to estimates in column F where regulatory variables were included as continuous variables. The PO dummy remains significantly positive with a coefficient larger than 10% after the inclusion of the VI and the partitioning of the ER variable into three dummy variables. The marginal effects of VI results not statistically different from zero, while only the subindicator ER1 presents a positive sign. In particular, the dummy for ER3 shows that consumers' satisfaction increase when they are given a choice for electricity supplier.
Finally, as the last robustness check we built some pseudo-panels by averaging across country and time the sex and occupation variable, following model (3) of previous section. Results, presented in Table 5 , show that while some macroeconomic variables, present a different sign or significance level than in previous analysis, and in particular the significantly negative coefficient of the Gini and the average price of electricity coefficients become statistically insignificant as well as, while the GDP per capita now has a significantly positive sign. What is more remarkable for the present analysis is that the broad picture of consumer satisfaction not positively correlated with joint policies of privatisation, vertical disintergration and liberalisation remain. In particular, the marginal effect of the PO indicators remains positive and statistically significant with magnitudes that are remarkably similar to that obtained with the estimation of model (2). 
Conclusions
This paper has presented a new empirical analysis of consumers' satisfaction for electricity service in the EU 15 member states. While some individual characteristics in the samples, and some macroeconomic controls may contribute to explain the degree of satisfaction in Eurobarometer surveys 2002 Eurobarometer surveys to 2004 , in these concluding remarks we focus on the impact of regulatory variables.
The electricity reforms in Europe over the last years have often assumed that efficiency and welfare would be enhanced by three institutional changes: privatisation, unbundling and liberalisation. The three reforms are usually considered as related. This does not seem to be a necessary condition for industry change, however, because in principle there may be liberalisation without (full or partial) privatisation of the incumbent; and because there may be privatisation without (full or partial) liberalisation, unbundling is also not necessriliy implied to achieve other changes. In fact across the EU member states and over time we can observe several patterns. For example, around 2000-2003, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Italy and Spain all have mixed ownership with unbundling and TPA, while France, Ireland and Greece still have a mostly government-owned incumbent. Belgium used to have a mostly private vertically integrated industry since the 1970s, and only recently there was unbundling and TPA. Germany used to have mixed ownership of the electricity industry since the 1970s and never changed this feature, while slowly moved from no TPA to regulated TPA in recent years. The UK was the front-runner of the comprehensive reform paradigm, but some Scandinavian countries have taken a different path. Thus, in this paper we have asked a simple question: are consumers happier with SGI in countries where the reforms have been implemented? Can we disentangle the effect on attitudes of privatisation from liberalisation?
As for privatisation, rather surprisingly, we find that consumers' satisfaction about prices is higher in countries where public ownership of electricity industry is large. Unbundling and market entry in some models seem, however, to be associated with a more positive perception of electricity prices. Thus, one may be tempted to conclude that the consumer perceives to be more protected when there are both government ownership and some competition, with a more robust evidence for the former than for the latter.
In fact, our empirical analysis shows that any expectation of a simple EU-wide positive linear relation between consumers' satisfaction and the extent of privatisation-liberalisation-vertical integration reforms is not supported by the available evidence.
These findings suggest that the recent move by the EC to ask for a mandatory ownership separation of electricity networks may overshoot the target. The EC tends to impose a uniform industrial organisation and reform architecture to all Member States. This uniformity of design seems however to be questionable. The evidence that a unique reform design makes consumer more satisfied everywhere is weak. We have tested that average price at country level do influence perceptions, in the expected way. European policy should in first instance protect the consumers against monopoly rents, and should focus on addressing cross-country price dispersion, i.e. should focus more on outcomes and trade barriers more than in reform engineering.
Removing the reasons of bottlenecks in regional electricity markets (e.g. investment constraints in the Trans-European transmission network) seems more important than insisting on just one reform path. Moreover, it seems to be still wise that the EC, remains neutral on public versus private ownership of utilities. 
